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The paper studies regional (spatial) inequality in five most populous
countries in the world: China, India, the United States of America,
Indonesia and Brazil in the period 1980-2000. They are all federations
composed of entities (states or provinces) with substantial autonomy. Two
types of regional inequalities are considered: Concept 1 inequality which
is inequality between mean incomes (GDPs per capita) of states/provinces
and Concert 2 inequality which is inequality between population-weighted
regional mean incomes. The first inequality speaks to the issues of
income convergence, the second, to the issue of overall inequality as
perceived by citizens within a nation. China and India show  rising
inequality in terms of both concepts in the decade of the 1990’s;
Indonesia, on the contrary, displays decreasing inequality in both from the
early 1980’s up to the Asian crisis. Overall, we find that openness is
negatively associated with Concept 1 regional inequality, and positively
with Concept 2 inequality. Openness thus seems to help poorer regions
(within nations) to catch up, but also leads to  disparity in outcomes for
populous states with some getting ahead and  others falling behind.
Maharashtra vs. Bihar, and Shandong vs. Sichuan provide nice examples
of such outcomes in India and China. Higher inflation and higher real
interest rate are also associated with greater Concept 2 regional inequality.
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1. Introduction
Global inequality is strongly influenced by what happens to populous countries,
both to their average income levels, and inequality within each country. If we look at the
former, fast growth rates of China and more recently of India, by reducing their relative
income distance from the United States and other rich countries, have lowered global
inequality. Fast (average) growth in these nations is certainty the most important element
contributing both to lower global inequality and lower global poverty. At the same time
however within these nations, there are increasing cleavages: some provinces grow faster
than others, so mean income differences between the provinces increase. In addition, the
process of growth is accompanied in both China and India by increasing inequality
between individuals in the country as well as within most provinces and states  (see for
example, Jha (no date) for India; Chen and Wang ( 2001) for China). 
The objective of  this paper is to explore the subnational changes in five most
populous countries in the world: China, India, United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. We
examine these changes  for three reasons. First, as already mentioned, subnational
changes are important because of the number of people involved they are a significant
determinants of global inequality. To see this, replace China with its component
provinces; then, rising differences in mean incomes between various provinces will add
to global inequality at the same time as the diminishing relative distance between various
provincial incomes and incomes of rich countries will reduce world inequality. The
second reason lies in   what subnational changes imply for national unity. One of the
concerns of the Chinese leadership is how rising income differences between the
prosperous coastal provinces and the less dynamic North East may  affect China’s
political unity (see Renard, 2002). The third reason to look at the subnational level is that
it provides us with some lessons regarding what we might expect at the global level were
most of the obstacles to the free circulation of labor, capital and goods to be lifted. For
obviously although these obstacles still exist in a number of countries even between their
constituent units, they are dramatically lower than between the nations.  For example,
shipment of goods between different Indian states is, in some cases, still subject to fees or3
border check but this is a far cry from the obstacles to international trade. Similarly, labor
mobility in China is formally restricted as people need to have a permit in order to live in
large cities but these rules are most often ignored, and even if they were fully
implemented, the rules are much less stringent than the rules governing circulation of
labor between nations. It is thus important to find out whether a generally unhindered
movement of goods, labor and capital leads provinces toward convergence in their mean
incomes or not. 
A comparison between subnational inequalities in these five countries is
meaningful despite the fact that the number and size of regional units vary. If states and
provinces were based on randomly drawn border lines, it could be indeed argued that
greater regional inequality in one country is simply an artifact, possibly due to the way
such regional units are defined. However, in most or all cases with which we deal here,
provinces/states possess both a significant amount of autonomy and specificity.
Inequality between them thus does have a bearing on the issues of horizontal equity, and
particularly so where states differ in their religious and ethnic composition. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present some data that
show the importance of the five countries in total world income and population as well as
the importance of the differences between their mean incomes for explaining global
inequality. In Section 3, we move to the subnational level of analysis, and present a brief
review of the literature dealing with the issue of regional inequality in the five countries.
In Sections 4 and 5, we look at the evolution of the differences between mean incomes of
the regions during the last twenty years in each of the five nations.
2 It is here that we
address the issues of income convergence or divergence within each country. In Section
6, we look at the differences in mean regional incomes but now with each region
weighted by its population share. Once we weigh them by their populations, we come
closer to explaining the actual “feeling” of inequality within each nation particularly
                                                          
2 We use the term “region” to indicate a subnational unit whether its exact appellation is “state” or
“province” or “republic”; the term “nation” or “country” is used to designate the subjects of international
laws, that is the five countries included in the analysis here.4
when differences in mean regional incomes coincide with other horizontal cleavages like
ethnicity or religion. We also come closer to explaining the overall national inequality
between individuals for the only part which is not included now is the part of
inequality—at times substantial, it is true—which is due to inter-personal income
differences within each region. In Section 7, we try to identify the policies or factors at
the national level which might explain the process of regional convergence or divergence;
in other words, we try to find some regularities explaining why regions are converging or
diverging. Section 8 presents conclusions. 5
2. The importance of the five countries in the world 
Table 1 shows the share of the five most populous countries in world population
and income in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  Their share in world population has throughout
remained at just above one-half. However, their share in world output has expanded from
being a bit over one-third to 44 percent.  
Table 1.Share of the five largest countries in world population and 





Share in world PPP
output
34.3 36.6 44.0
The increase in the five countries’ share in world income was driven by the
growth (compared to world mean income) of all countries save Brazil (Table 2). The
most extraordinary was of course China’s growth. In 1980, China’s GDP per capita was
just under 17 percent of  the world average. In 2000, it was in excess of 60 percent. The
United States likewise grew faster than world mean income: its GDP per capita was 4.3
times greater than the world mean in 1980, while in 2000, it was almost 4.6 times as high.6
Table 2. The five large countries’ GDPs per capita compared to the world mean
1980 1990 2000 Change 
(1980-2000)
India 0.164 0.206 0.246 +0.082
China 0.169 0.307 0.602 +0.433
Indonesia 0.364 0.495 0.527 +0.163
Brazil 1.029 0.869 0.822 -0.207
United States 4.308 4.470 4.579 +0.271
Note: All calculations done for GDP per capita expressed in 1995 international (PPP) dollars.
Being populous, these countries  will obviously influence, sometimes decisively,
what happens to global inequality. However when we address the issues of global
inequality we have to be very careful in what exactly we are measuring. The first concept
of inequality (dubbed Concept 1 by Milanovic, 2004)) measures differences in mean
incomes between countries. No weighting is involved here and each country counts the
same. This concept is important if we are interested if there is unconditional divergence
or convergence of mean (countries’) incomes in the world, or as we shall see in Section 4
below, if there is such a convergence between regional incomes at the level of each
nation. 
Concept 2 inequality is different. It likewise takes mean national incomes but
weighs them by countries’ populations. Now, of course, our five countries will matter a
lot because, as we have just seen, they account for almost one-half of world income and
population. But when we use Concept 2 inequality, we of course disregard the entire
inequality due to the differences in incomes within nations, that is we assume that each
individual has the mean income of his/her country. The Concept 3 inequality (inequality
between all individuals in the world) is underestimated by the Concept 2 inequality. Yet,
if differences in mean incomes between populous countries are large –as they indeed
are—then Concept 2 inequality would tend to explain a lot of Concept 3 inequality. As a
matter of fact, about ¾ of Concept 3 inequality is accounted by differences in mean
incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2002 and 2004). 7
Table 3 shows that the interactions between the five countries alone (that is,
disregarding their interactions with other counties) account for between a fifth and a third
of total Concept 2 inequality in the world. It is important to explain how these
calculations are done. Consider the Gini coefficient. In the case of Concept 2 inequality,












where yi = GDP per capita of i-th country (and yj>yi), pi = population share of i-th
country, and µ = mean world income. Thus, Gini 2 (world) is calculated by taking the
absolute differences in mean incomes between all countries in the world, normalizing
them by world mean income and weighing by population shares. To calculate the part
due to the five countries we “extract” only those individual  inter-country terms (ICT),




 where both i and j are belong to “our” five countries. Thus, for
example, in 1980, the US GDP per capita was $PPP 21,755 and China’s $PPP 852. The
difference between the two amounted to $PPP 20,900. In terms of world mean income
(which was then $5,050), the difference was 4.13. This is in turn weighted by US and
Chinese population shares (0.054 and 0.234 respectively), and the obtained value 5.3 Gini
points represents the contribution to Concept 2 world Gini of the difference in mean
incomes between the  United States and China. The same calculation is repeated for all
five countries (there is in total 10 such calculations). The sum gives the total amount of
direct contribution due to the interaction between the five countries (differences in their
mean incomes). As Table 3 shows, it did not change much in the last twenty years: it
oscillated around 11 Gini points throughout.
Note however that these calculations leave out all the similar interactions between
each of our five countries and the rest of the world (say, China vs. Germany, or US vs.
Nigeria, or India vs. Senegal etc.) which also contribute to world inequality. If we then
add all of these contributions, we notice that they have declined from almost 17 Gini8
points in 1980 to 14 Gini points in 2000. The decline was almost entirely due to China’s
fast growth that diminished the distance and hence the inequality terms between it and the
rest of the (rich) world. Overall the five largest countries contribute around one-half of
total global Concept 2 inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
Differently, we can measure inequality by using the Theil index. The Theil index













Here we take the same approach: we “extract” only the 
µ µ
yi yi
pi ln  terms
belonging to our five countries. There are no interactions between countries’ mean
incomes. The contribution of the US is obtained (again using the 1980 data) as the
product of its population share (0.054) with its income relative to world mean
(20,900/5050=4.308) times the log of the last amount. To get the total contribution of the
five countries, we simply add such amounts. 
3  Their contribution to the global Theil-
measured  Concept 2 inequality varies between one-third in 1980 and 37 percent in 2000
(Table 3).  
In conclusion, the five largest countries “explain” between 37 (using Theil) and
50 percent (using Gini) of global Concept 2 inequality. 
                                                          
3 Unlike the Gini coefficient which is based on bilateral comparisons of income between all countries and
allows us thus to distinguish the contribution of each and every pair of countries, Theil index just sums
individual countries’ contributions. In other words, it cannot distinguish between the contribution due to the
interaction between the five countries themselves, and the five countries and the rest of the world.9
Table 3. Direct and total contribution of the five largest countries to 
Concept 2 global inequality
1980 1990 2000
Gini
Concept 2 Gini (world) 54.1 52.9 50.2
Interaction between the five countries
(Gini points)
11.6 10.8 11.3
Interaction of the five with other
countries (Gini points)
16.9 15.6 14.0
Total percentage contribution 53 50 50
Theil entropy
Concept 2 Theil (world) 63.3 59.8 52.3
Contribution of five largest countries
(Theil points)
21.0 17.8 19.4
Percentage contribution 33 30 37
Note: Concept 2 inequality is inequality between mean countries’  GDPs per capita  weighted by
countries’ populations. 10
3. A brief review of regional (within-country) inequality studies
4
The issues we address here—Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality—have been, in a
slightly different context, addressed before. This was done in two contexts. The first is
the issue of regional inequality within countries. There are two views in the literature that
are often juxtaposed. The first is due to Williamson (1965)  who argued that in the early
stages of economic development, regional inequality would tend to rise as growth occurs
in discrete locales, but that later inequalities will decline as equilibrating forces such as
better infrastructure, technological diffusion, decreasing returns to capital in richer and
high-wage areas, diseconomies of agglomeration etc. become stronger. Thus, regional
inequality is expected to follow an inverted U shape as income level grows. Williamson’s
reasoning is closely related to the idea of the Kuznets curve where similar development
although not in spatial terms produces first an increase and then a decline in inequality. It
is also based on neoclassical (Solow-type) assumptions which include decreasing
marginal returns.  A different view has been proposed more recently  within the context
of the new economic geography school (Krugman and Venables, 1995) and endogenous
growth (Romer  1986; see also a recent review by Easterly and Levine 2002). There the
argument is that that increasing returns to scale and thus advantages of agglomeration of
capital and knowledge will tend to perpetuate, or even increase, spatial inequalities. Yet
in Krugman and Venables (1995), decreasing transportation costs may play an offsetting
role: assume that transportation costs are zero, then the advantage of cheap labor in less
developed countries (or regions) will, to some extent, tend to offset the advantages of
increasing returns to scale.
The key difference between these two approaches seems not to lie in their view of the
short-run developments, where they all, including the earlier development theories such
as Myrdal’s (1957), Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943), Hirschmann (1958) or Perroux (1970;
1988), seem to agree that growth is disequalizing, but  in the view of the long-run
developments where either traditional neoclassical assumptions dominate—rendering
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personal) inequality.11
growth ultimately equalizing in spatial terms as well—or where such assumptions are
rejected or made less potent thus weakening the forces which make for spatial equality in
the long-run. 
5 Recently, the short- and long-run aspects have been combined in a paper
by Petrakos, Rodriguez-Pose and Roviolis (2003), which looks at the regional
inequalities within the European  Union (with several regions defined within each
country). The authors find that that the short-term effects of growth are disequalizing in
the sense that higher growth rate tends to increase regional inequality (controlling for all
other country-relevant attributes), while higher income level is associated with lower
regional inequality. The authors interpret the second finding as implying the long-run
equilibrating effects of growth along the lines of the Solow and Williamson models.
Their measure of regional inequality, as in several other papers (e.g. Akita and Kataoka
(2003) regarding Japan; Akita and Kawamura (1992) regarding Indonesia and China;
Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003) and Kanbur and Zhang (2003) for China) is the
population-weighted coefficient of variation or population weighted Theil index. This is
what we called Concept 2 inequality, and the justification for using Concept 2  (rather
than Concept 1) inequality is that it reflects regional inequality as experienced by an
“average” person; in other words, regional divergence which may be due to a few
sparsely populated regions’ either very fast or very slow growth is rather irrelevant for
the actual feeling of spatial (horizontal) inequality as experienced by the people in the
country. 
But the issue of regional inequality—using Concept 1 inequality—has also recently
received quite a lot of prominence due to the popularity enjoyed by the so-called growth
convergence literature. While the convergence issues have originally been defined and
studied at the level of countries (that is, convergence of national economies), they have
recently been studied at the level of subnational regions. For the countries included here,
such papers are Zhang, Liu and Yao (2001) for China, Azzoni (2001) for Brazil, Ram
(1992) for the United States, and Jha (no date) and Dreze and Srinivasan (2000) for
                                                          
5 There is an obvious link between these views, as couched in terns of regional developmests within
individual countries and regional developments in the world as in Krugman and Venables (1995) or
Krugman (1991).12
India.
6 The rationale for the interest in Concept 1 inequality is very different from the
interest in Concept 2 inequality. The issue of convergence of (unweighted) regions within
a country, or (unweighted) countries in the world, addresses the problem of whether the
same or similar economic policies produce similar results or not. Consider the example of
a country which has a single national economic policy, that is where there is no
significant regional freedom of economic policy-making. Suppose that Concept 2
regional inequality is decreasing. But if we still find that Concept 1 inequality is
increasing, it raises the interesting question of what characteristics enjoyed by some
regions are responsible for their not catching up (or for their growing too fast). Thus both
Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality are of interest. 
We shall now briefly review some of key (representative) regional inequality studies
that deal with the five great federations included here. Other papers which deal with these
countries will be mentioned in Chapters 5-7 when we present our results. The studies of
China are the most numerous. There are two reasons for this. First, the extremely fast
growth of Chinese economy over the last quarter century has been associated with
increasing regional inequalities. This has obvious implications both for political stability
and for economic theory, that is for figuring out why and how certain regions grow and
others don’t, and whether the dominant feature of China’s inequality is rural vs. urban
inequality or inter-provincial inequality. The consensus seems to be that it is the former. 
7
For example, Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003) calculate inequality in per capita
consumption across provincial and urban-rural partitions (that is, they use data for mean
annual incomes for  rural and urban areas for each province, that is 28 provinces times 2
= 56 observations
8) and find that in 1995,  more than ¾ of thus calculated Theil-based
                                                          
6  For other countries, see Goerlich and Mas (2001) for Spanish provinces, Yemtsov (2002) for the  subjects
of the Russian federation.
7 When it comes to inter-provincial inequality, it seems to be more the case of  “club” inequality, that is of
three clubs (East, West, Center) diverging from each other. See Annex 2 below; alsoYao and Zhang (2001).
8 More exactly, they have the data on mean per capita consumption of peasants and non-peasants (by
province) as obtained from Chinese household surveys. They interpret peasant consumoption to be rural,
and likewise non-peasant to be equivalent to urban (see Bhalla et al, p. 945).  See Annex 2.13
Concept 2 inequality is accounted for by the rural-urban split.
9 This is a result similar to
the one obtained by Kanbur and Zhang (2003) who find that the same urban-rural split
(that is, the difference between the mean urban and the mean rural income) explains  56
percent of Concept 2 inequality (calculated from the same 56 observations).
10 The results
of these two studies and a few others are compared in Annex 2. 
. 
The second reason lies in the lack of individual-level data on income inequality in
China, that is lack of data on Concept 3 inequality. Concept 2 regional inequality can be
used, if our partitioning is sufficiently fine, to approximate the evolution in Concept 3
inequality. In other words, if we think that most of inequality is spatial, and use a very
fine partition (that is, divide the country in meaningful but also numerous regional units)
then thus calculated Concept 2 inequality should approximate, if not necessarily the level
then the evolution, of Concept 3 inequality. To see this consider that, at the extreme,
every individual can be treated as a “region”: then Concept 2 inequality collapses into
Concept 3 inequality.  This was, for example, the approach underlying Kanbur and Zhang
(2003) paper on regional inequality in China. As in the Bhalla et al. (2003), Kanbur and
Zhang divide China into 28 provinces and each of the provinces into its rural and urban
areas. They have the data for mean incomes within each of thus defined 56 regions, and
this annually for the period 1952-2000. They calculate Concept 2 inequality from these
means, find also that the rural-urban split accounts for the bulk of total inequality (much
more than the inland-coastal split)
11 but use the Concept 2 inequality as a proxy for the
Concept 3  inequality. Then they try to relate changes in Concept 2 inequality levels over
the last 50 years to various policy episodes (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution,
agricultural liberalization, urban and industrial liberalization etc.) They find that the
Concept 2 inequality, with this relatively fine partition, amounts in 2000 to a Gini of 37.2
                                                          
9 It is notable that the share of the urban-rural difference in total appears constantly high, that is between 70
and 80 percent, from 1952 to the end of century (see Bhalla et al (2003, Table 2, p. 947)).
10 Why these two results are not the same is puzzling.
11 Although after 1993, there is a rapid increase in the within-urban and  within-rural components indicating
that there is a widening income differentiation within urban and within rural areas as well.14
which, of course, sets a rather high lower bound to total personal size income inequality
in China.
12
As for other countries, Jha (no date), in a study of India’s inequality over the last fifty
years looks at the issue of Concept 1 convergence between the states and concludes that
divergence has been more common and has accelerated since the reforms in the early
1990’s. Ram (1992),  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) have done similar analysis for
the United States. Ram (1992) finds a steadily decreasing inter-state inequality from 1950
to 1980 and an increase in the next decade.
As this brief review shows, regional inequality studies fall into three categories that
closely match our three concepts of inequality. Many of them, in the wake of the
convergence literature, deal with Concept 1 inequality. Others, perhaps equally
numerous, deal with Concept 2 inequality—regional or horizontal inequality as actually
“experienced” by the population. Finally, some use regional partition (Concept 2
inequality) as a proxy for Concept 3 inequality. 
It should be noted that the work on the regional inequality is not facilitated by the
absence of an accepted or clear terminology. The results are often impenetrable because
the same term, say “regional inequality” may be used to represent Concept 1 or Concept
2 inequality. Even the term “region” is sometimes used for the smallest units (say, states
in a country) and, perhaps in the same paper, for the agglomeration of several such units
into a larger whole which is still not national level (thus, for example, authors often write
of China’s three regions: East, Center and West, and of China’s regions, meaning in the
latter case provinces). As a consequence, “regional inequality” might mean either one of
the four combinations:  Concept 1 or Concept 2 inequality, or inequality between the
provinces or inequality between agglomerations of provinces, that is larger “regions.”
Moreover, the share of the between (inter-regional) component is quite different—even if
                                                          
12 When we use regional GDP per capita as welfare indicator (as here) to derive Concept 2 inequality, its
value cannot be fully taken as the lower bound of Conmcept 3 inequality because of likely transfers
between the regions. This is different from the analysis on the global level when redistributive transfers
between the countries are minimal.15
the partitions are the same—if we is the “between” share in total interpersonal (Concept
3) inequality or in Concept 2 inequality.
13
Even the measures of inequality are often opaque. While many authors use Theil
indexes because of their decomposition properties, it is not always clear if Theil (1)  also
known as Theil entropy measure, or Theil (0) also known as mean log deviation index is
used. While the use of one or another Theil index does not have an impact on results
within each individual study (since the measures move almost always the same way), it
does render difficult comparison of the absolute values of inequality measures from
several different studies.
14 We have tried to be as clear as possible in our terminology
here and to the risk of being repetitive will use “Concept 1” and “Concept 2” inequality
often in order to avoid possible misunderstanding.  Similarly, we shall try to be clear
about the “partition” we use: states (provinces) adding up to a nation, or states
(provinces) adding up to regions which then add up to a nation.
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 For example, in a very detailed summary of the results of the “between” component in different country
studies given in Sharrocks and Wan (2004, Table 1A), total inequality against which the “between”
component is meaasured is sometimes Concept 2 and sometimes Concept 3 inequality.
14 Yet another problem seems to be that some authors use natural logs and others use logs with the base of
10. Again, this does not matter for individual studies, but does matter for comparative work.16
4. The five federations: descriptive statistics and Concept 1 inequality
The analysis of each individual country’s inequality  is conducted on the basis of
regional GDPs per capita expressed in nominal prices. Thus, inequality between regions
calculated for each individual year is inequality between regional nominal incomes. 
15
Clearly, to the extent that  there are price differences within a country and  price levels
are higher in richer regions, such inequality statistics will tend to overestimate intra-
regional inequality. 
In order to adjust for that and also to allow for comparison between regions
belonging to different counties, all regional GDPs are also expressed in real terms. First,
they are expressed in real units of  the domestic currency and then converted into the
1995 international dollars ($PPP). The typical pattern of conversion is the one for China
as expressed in equation (1) where Y denotes provincial GDP per capita, r = real
provincial growth rate, DD = country-wide deflator, and PPP = PPP-equivalent dollar
exchange rate. We have, from the Chinese statistics, real annual provincial growth rates
expressed in 1978 all-China prices. This means that real income of region i, country j
(=China here) and year t (subsequent to 1978) is obtained by applying real growth rates
to the nominal 1978 regional income.  Note that the application of real growth rates from
region to region implies that differences in annual inflation between the regions are
accounted for. This amount,  that is provincial income in year t expressed in 1978 prices
(the denominator in equation 1) is then, using the country-wide deflator between 1978
and 1995 (DDj,78,95), converted into all-China 1995 prices.
16  This is finally converted
into international dollars by using the 1995 purchasing power exchange rate of that
country (obtained from the World Bank data).
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15 Except in Indonesia for which we have only real provincial incomes.
16 Note that the deflator has only country (j) subscript. 17
where the subscript d denotes domestic constant prices, and subscript $
international prices.
A slightly different approach is used for the US regions. Nominal incomes (year t
expressed in dollars of the same year) are converted using the overall country’s deflator
(DDj) which converts t year’s dollars into the 1995 dollars. This implies that price
differences across US states are non-existent. Since the US prices are, by construction,
made to equal to international prices, the PPP convertor is equal to 1 (equation 2)
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Table 4 shows our coverage of the five countries.  More detailed information
regarding countries’ administrative structure and our data coverage is given in Annex 1.18
Table 4. Regions in the five countries: descriptive statistics
China India USA Brazil Indonesia
Period included 1978-2001 1980-2000 1977-2001 1985-2001 1983-2001










Constant prices (year) 1978 1980-81 1995 1985 1983
Number of regions
included in the study
27 14 50 26 26
Total number of regions
in the country




























--- --- East Timor 3/
Total population
(million; in 2000) 1/
1,271 1,033 283 172 213
Population coverage  (in
percent; 2000) 2/















5.6 (Ningxia) 20.6 (Haryana) 0.5
(Wyoming)
0.3 (Roraima) 1.2 (Maluku)
Richest region (year













2000; in tho. 1995
international dollars) 








13.6 4.4 2.1 7.0 12.5
Median region by
income (year 2000; in
tho. 1995 international
dollars)





GDP per capita (year
2000; in tho. 1995
international dollars)
4.1 1.7 31.5 5.7 3.6
Note: For the purposes of comparison, GDP per capita is always expressed in 1995 international
dollars. No region-specific PPP rates are used (e.g. all regions of a given country have their GDP per capita
converted into $PPP using a single exchange rate). Full list of included regions is given in Annex 1.
1/ Excludes disputed regions as well as Hong Kong and Macau in the case of China.  2/ Population
in regions included in the study divided by total population  as defined here. 3/ Pacific and Caribbean
possessions include 12 territories  only 5 of  which (Puerto Rico, Guam, US Virgin Islands, American19
Samoa and Mariana Islands) have resident population apart from the military. Their total population is 4.4
million (see http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108295.html). 3/ East Timor was included in the Indonesian
data until independence in 1999.  For consistency, we have excluded it throughout.20
Figure 1 shows Concept 1 inequality for the five countries.
Figure 1. Concept 1 (unweighted inter-regional inequality) in the five countries
Gini Theil
Note: Concept 1 inequality is calculated in nominal terms (except for Indonesia where we have real data
only).
We see that the level of inter-regional inequality is much higher in Indonesia than
elsewhere, that next come China and Brazil, followed by India and than the lowest level
of inter-regional inequality is in the United States, despite the fact that the US has the
highest number of states and that there is a presumption that Concept 1 inequality will
increase with greater number of partitions (see Proposition 1 in Shorrocks and Wan,
2004). As we can see from Figure 1, the Concept 1 Gini is almost 40 for Indonesia, for
China and Brazil, it is between 25 and 30, for India, it is approaching 20 and for the






















































































But the figures also reveal very different time patterns in the evolution of Concept
1 inequality. Indonesia and China which have the highest levels of inequality display also
significant reductions throughout the 1980’s. For China, the period of regional
equalization comes to a close around 1990 and is reversed afterwards, for Indonesia, it
continues until the mid-1990’s. Brazil does not show any noticeable trend. In the case of
India, regional inequality seems to be steadily rising almost the entire period. Finally, the
United States which has the lowest level of inter-regional differences, shows a burst of
increased inequality in the early 1980s, followed by a sustained if weak reduction since.
Overall,  regional inequality levels in the five countries are now (at the turn  of the
century) much more similar than twenty years ago.  This is obvious from Figure 1 where
(in terms of the Gini) the dispersal was between 10 and 50 in the early- or mid-1980s, and
has by year 2000 shrunk  to between 10 and about 35.
When we look at the evolution of inter-regional inequality within a country, we
need to distinguish between inter-regional inequality calculated in nominal and real
prices. As discussed earlier, the former is simply a comparison of regional nominal GDPs
per capita; the latter is calculated based on GDP per capita and a price structure of a
given year which  is then “augmented” by annual real growth rates. The results presented
in Figure 1 are based on nominal magnitudes with the exception of Indonesia where we
had access to real data only. However, in China and India nominal and real inequality
measures do not move in parallel.22
Figure 2. China: Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal 
and real terms (1978 prices)
Note: Provinces of Qinghai and Hainan (populations of respectively 5 and 7 million) are not
included in the calculations based on real GDP per capita due to the  lack of data. They are included in the
nominal GDP data series though.
Figure 2 shows  very different evolutions of the two inequalities in the case of
China. If we look at nominal differences in GDP per capita, we note a strong  reduction
in inter-provincial inequality up to 1990, and a slightly increased level since. The decline
in nominal inequalities (which is even more dramatic if we look at the Theil than at the
Gini measure and which thus implies that the catch up has been particularly strong for the
poor provinces) coincides with the period of agricultural liberalization. Since 1990,
approximately around the time when China enters more substantial liberalization in the
urban sector,  this trend is reversed. However if we look at inter-provincial inequality in
real terms, we see that it remained around Gini of 35 throughout the entire period. The
implication of these different movements in real and nominal Gini and Theil is that there
has been a price catch up of the poorer provinces.  In other words, if in 1978, the poorer
provinces had a lower price level,
17 then while their real growth rates did not
systematically differ from those of the rich provinces, their relative price level must have
                                                          
17 This is a very sensible supposition although we cannot prove it since Chinese statistics publish only
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risen in order to observe a decline in nominal inter-provincial inequality. After 1990, the
two measures move the same way indicating that the price catch-up has stopped.
Figure 3. India:  Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal 
and real terms (1980-81 prices)
Note: The data on 1999 real GDPs per capita are incomplete and hence not included. 
In India, both real- and nominal-based Concept 1 inequality was rising during the
last twenty years (Figure 3). However, the same phenomenon of the poorer states’ catch-
up in terms of price levels is obvious here too as real-based inter-state inequality is higher
than the inequality calculated from nominal state  GDPs per capita. 
In Brazil,  inter-state inequality moves up during the periods of high and volatile
inflation: between 1986 and 1990 inflation accelerated from 150 percent annually to
almost 3000 percent and inter-state inequality, measured by nominal GDPs per capita,
rose. (However inequality measured in real terms stayed constant).  Deceleration of
inflation in 1991 was accompanied by a decline in inter-state income differences. But
during the next three years as inflation accelerated again (from 400 percent in 1991 to
more than 2000 in 1994), nominal inter-state inequality rose again.  This is an evolution
very similar to what we observe for the United States where also inter-state inequality
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per capita are very differently affected from state to state when inflation ids  high. This is
not unexpected. We know that high inflation and hyperinflation are accompanied by
greater price volatility, that is real prices of goods and services vary more in high
inflation environments (see Parks (1978) and for more recent evidence, Dabus (2000)). It
is then not surprising that different states—which produce different output mixes—will
also tend to be affected more unevenly when inflation is high than when it is low.
Figure 4. Brazil: Concept 1 inequality calculated in nominal 
and real terms (1995 prices)
Note: The state of Tocantins, due to lack of data, is not included in years 1985-1988.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of regional GDPs per capita (expressed in 1995
international dollars) in the five countries, in the first year for which the data are available
and in 2000.  Consider first the United States and Indonesia which, as we have seen, have
witnessed a reduction of inter-regional inequalities. This trend is reflected in Figures (a)
and (e) by a much smaller and less lengthy right-end tail at the end of the period. In 2000,
the US distribution of regional GDPs per capita is almost exactly lognormal, the right
skewness having disappeared.  In Indonesia too there was a rightward shift of the
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too much. For example, East Kalamantan which was the second richest  province in 1983
has seen its per capita income increase from about $PPP10,400 to $PPP 13,700; the
richest province in 1983 was Riau with $10,800 but in 2000 Riau’s GDP per capita was
only $PPP 9,300 (and it was still the second richest province). Contrast this with more
than the doubling of real incomes in the very poorest provinces in Indonesia: East and
West Nusa Tenggara where incomes in 1983 were at around $600 per capita and
increased to between $PPP 1200 and $PPP 1500 in the tear 2000. Lampung, the third
poorest province went from $PPP 700 to $PPP 1700.  Thus, regional differences in
Indonesia decreased a lot—and as we have seen in the previous section this was a long-
run  process.   
For China, we see a remarkable rightward shift of the distribution as all of the
provinces became richer. There was  also a complicated process that, on the one hand, led
to much less clustering of the provinces (note the much lower height  of the mode in 2000
than in 1980) while on the other hand,  the rich provinces which in 1980 seemed to be
clear outliers are less so now. Shanghai’s (the richest region) GDP per capita has
decreased from being almost 7 times as high as the all-China mean in 1980 to being 5.4
times as high. Figure 5 (b) reflects this by a lower right-end skewness and greater kurtosis
(the thickness of the right-end tail).
Distribution of Indian states has changed in a similar way to that of China even if
the rightward shift of all is not nearly as impressive.  However here too the height of the
mode of the distribution is less in 1999 than in 1980, that is clustering is less which, of
course, contributes to regional inequality.
The least change is apparent in the case of Brazil where the distribution moved
slightly to the right (as the country did register modest growth between 1985 and 2000)
and the distribution of states GDPs per capita remained rather unchanged. 26
Figure 5. Distribution of regions circa 1980 and 2000
by their ln GDP per capita in ’95 international dollars
       United States, 1980 and 2000   China, 1980-2000
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Figure 5 (continued)
Indonesia, 1983 and 2000
Note: Data for the United States do not include Alaska. Density functions are drawn
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5. Identifying periods of regional convergence and divergence
In this section we look some more at the issue of regional convergence and
divergence using Concept 1 definition. The simplest approach is to look for the existence
of unconditional convergence. In this case, regional  rates of growth over a period
(generally, five-years) are regressed on initial regional income levels as in (3)
it t i t i it e y y y +   + = − − 1 0 − 5 , 5 , ln ln β β (3)
where as before i is i-th region, t is time, y = real GDP per capita, and the sign of
the coefficient β1 indicates presence or absence of unconditional convergence. The
regression is calculated, of course, for each country and for all years. The latter is done in
order to avoid biasing the results through choice of the time period and stage of the
economic cycle. Petrakos et al. (2002, p. 4) for example show how, using the same data,
the choice of different time intervals may yield  either convergence or divergence.
18
Figure 6 displays the values of the β1  coefficient. The value of (say) –0.02 for
year t means that each ten percent increase in the initial GDP per capita (that is, in year
t-5) is associated with 0.2 percent slower annual growth over the next five years. What
we readily notice from the results in Figure 6 where the β values are charted together with
their 95 confidence intervals is that in most cases we cannot accept—at conventional
levels of significance—the hypothesis of unconditional convergence or divergence. For
both China and India, it is only towards the mid- or late- 1990’s that there is enough
evidence to accept the hypothesis of unconditional divergence.
19 Thus, in China, it was
growth over the five-year period ending in 1999 that was disequalizing.
20 For India, it is
                                                          
18 In addition, even the interpretation of β<0 as indicating convergence is doubtful since β will be
negatively biased (the Galton’s fallacy). For a discussion see Bliss (1999). However we follow the rest of
the literature in interpreting results of (3) as indicating the presence or absence of convergence.
19 Although there again, the 95 lower bound is just hovering around the value of zero.
20 Zhang, Liu and Yao (2001) look at the convergence of China’s three large regions (East, Central and
West).  They find some evidence for conditional convergence to own steady-states as growth rates of East
and West are negatively related to their income levels (see Table 1, p. 247). However, unconditionally East
and West seem to be diverging.  29
the period from 1991 onwards. For Brazil, there is evidence of convergence in the period
between 1985 and 1992. 
The United States displays the most interesting feature. A period of unconditional
divergence in the late 1970s-early 1980s is followed by a very long period lasting two
decades of almost uninterrupted unconditional convergence (except for the recession in
1990-91).  Moreover, the divergence in the late 1970s-early 1980s is solely due to the
huge increase in GDP per capita in Alaska, the result of the tripling of oil prices in the
1979. If we eliminate Alaska, conditional divergence in the early 1980’s evaporates.
What is remarkable about the US experience is that in the United States the level of
Concept 1 inequality is already by far the lowest (see Figure 1) and it has still
experienced sustained regional convergence during the last quarter of century.30
Figure 6.  Unconditional β regional convergence or divergence
(β coefficient with the 95 confidence interval)
   United States      United States w/o Alaska     China 
Brazil   Indonesia India
Note: the regression is ROG(t-5,t)=β0+β1 log GDP (t-5) where ROG=annualized per capita growth rate
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The only other country that shows sustained convergence in Indonesia. Regional
convergence continues until the period of Asian crisis, that is, it comes to a close in the
five-year period ending in 1998. 
Table 5 summarizes the periods of unconditional convergence/divergence. As
mentioned above, the 1990’s were the period of divergence for India and China. Both
Indonesia and the United States experienced a very long period of convergence which has
recently come to an end. Brazil has experienced an early period of convergence (late
1980s) but no significant change either way after then. In Section 7,  we shall try to relate
these intra-national developments to macro economic and policy changes, in other words,
to see whether we can find economic variables that “explain” convergence or divergence
of regions within a single nation state.
Table 5. Periods of unconditional convergence or divergence
United
States
China India Brazil Indonesia
Convergence 1982-96 1985-92 1983-97
Divergence 1994-99 1991-99
Note: Divergence/convergence is accepted only if the β coefficient in (3) is significantly positive/negative
at the 5 percent level.32
6. Concept 2  regional inequality
In principle population-weighted inequality (Concept 2) is interesting mostly as a
stepping stone, or a lower bound to “true” inequality between individuals.  As mentioned
before, it also reflects the “feeling” of inequality within a country much better than the
unweighted Concept 1, particularly when regional inequalities coincide with other types
of horizontal cleavages. Changes in the population-weighted inequality  are important for
two additional reasons. First, we may want to see whether inequality is driven by the
differing population growth rates between the regions. For example, increasing Concept 2
inequality (and very likely increasing inter-personal inequality) may be due to migration
of the population into faster growing or richer regions. 
Secondly, an interesting issue is whether there is correlation between growth rates
and population size of different regions. This is in turn relevant for two  reasons.
Assuming for the moment that there is no migration between the regions, the evidence of
a positive relationship between population and growth may help shed additional light on
the issue of increasing returns to scale: greater population may help growth if it delays
the onset of  diminishing marginal returns. Second, higher growth in more populous
regions has obvious (positive) implications for the reduction in poverty. If growth rates
tend to be higher in more populous regions then everything else being the same, poverty
reduction will be greater.  
We now turn to these two issues: (i) the influence of uneven regional population
growth on Concept 2 inequality, and (ii) the association between regional population size
and per capita GDP growth. But before we do so, we need to quickly look at the results of
Concept 2 inequality for the five countries. They are displayed in Figure 7. 33
 
Figure 7. Concept 2 (population-weighted inter-regional inequality) in the five countries
Gini       Theil
Note: Based on nominal state-level GDP per capita except for Indonesia where only real
data are available.
Brazil shows the highest inequality with the Gini of about 30. As mentioned
before, Concept 2 inequality sets the lower bound to inter-personal (Concept 3)
inequality. This means that—were all individual within each state of Brazil to have the
same incomes—overall inequality in Brazil would still be substantial. Indonesia and
China have Ginis of about 25, India about 20 and the US less than 10. The ranking of the
countries is unchanged throughout the period.  In India and China, inequality was
generally on the rise, in Indonesia and somewhat less in Brazil, on the decline. The
decline for Indonesia is much clearer if we look at Theil (right-hand panel) than at the
Gini. Similarly for China too, regional inequality measured by Theil exhibits a downward
trend in the 1980’s. There is thus—in the case of China—a difference between the results


















































































characterized by the catch-up of the poorest (population-weighted) provinces. 
21 Because
of the importance of China, we address more fully the issue of China’s Concept 2
inequality in Annex 2.  However, for India there is a strong increase in Concept 2
inequality in the period of the 1990’s whether we use Gini or Theil. 
We move now to decompose the change in Gini between the first and the end-
year for each country. Table 6 compares Concept 2 inequality around year 1980 and in
the year 2000 and shows what Concept 2 inequality would have been if the
state/provincial distribution of  population had remained unchanged (see column 3). The
difference between the actual inequality in the year 2000 and this hypothetical inequality
is due to the differential population growth rates between the states. As column 5 in Table
6 illustrates, population change has in all the countries been unequalizing, that is the
change in population composition across the states/provinces has been such as to
contribute to higher regional (Concept 2) inequality. The effect ranges from hardly
significant at all in the United Stares and India to very substantial in Brazil, and
particularly so in  Indonesia. Concept 2 regional inequality in Indonesia decreased from a
Gini of 30 in the first year for which we have the data (1983) to 25.4 in the year 2000.
But the decline would have been even sharper, to a Gini to 22.6. had not the population
change been unequalizing. The three richest provinces in 2000 (East Kalimantan, Riau
and Jakarta) contained 4 percent of Indonesia’s population versus only 2.8 percent in
1983; provinces with income below the median also had about 1.5 percent greater
population share in 2000 than in 1983.  Thus, there was some “emptying out” of the
provinces with the middling level of income.  Similarly, in China, population  increase
was above average both in the poor and populous Gansu and Yunnan as well as in the
three richest entities Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin.
22
One has to be careful however in the interpretation of the population change. It is
true, in an accounting sense,  that had the composition of population by state remained
                                                          
21 This is because Theil is more sensitive than the Gini to what happens at the tails of distribution.
22  While all-China population increased by 32 percent between 1978 and 2000, (registered) population of
Shanghai increased by 52 percent, that of Beijing by 63 percent and of Tianjin by 38 percent.35
the same as in the 1980’s, regional inequality would have been less in all five countries.
However, this takes the per capita incomes by state as given. But in a deeper sense this is
wrong. This is because population might have moved in response to higher wages in
richer states bringing –let us suppose—in the process the per capita income in the richer
states down. Without such an equilibrating movement of labor, inequalities might have
been even greater.  Thus for a more meaningful analysis, we would need information on
natural vs. mechanical population changes by state/province. 36
Table 6. Concept 2 Gini coefficients with actual and hypothetical populations and income







































USA 6.9 8.3 8.2 +1.3 +0.1 7.2 +1.1 +0.1
China 23.9 24.4 23.8 +0.5 +0.6 24.7 -0.3 +0.2
India 14.8 18.7 18.6 +3.9 +0.1 15.0 +3.7 +0.1
Brazil 31.1 28.0 27.2 -3.1 +0.8 31.3 -3.3 +0.6
Indonesia 30.0 25.4 22.6 -4.6 +2.8 35.6 -10.2 -2.8
Note: The “circa 1980” means the first year for which the data are available: it is 1977 for the United States, 1978 for China, 1980 for India, 1985
for Brazil and 1983 for Indonesia. All Concept2 Ginis calculated from nominal data except for Indonesia. 37
We turn next to the contribution of differential growth rates to the change in
Concept 2 inequality.  Column 6 shows what would have been Concept 2 inequality in
2000 had all regions in the country grown at the same rate (and population been as it
really was in 2000).  Column 7 shows that different growth rates between the
states/provinces added to inequality in India (+3.7 Gini points) and the United States
(+1.1 point).  Their impact in China was negligible, while in Brazil, and particularly in
Indonesia, differential growth had a strong equalizing effect. In Indonesia, where both the
population and the growth effects were the strongest, movement of population had a
disequalizing effect  (as provinces at both ends of  income distribution increased their
population shares) while differential growth has had an equalizing (convergence) effect.
The latter is not a surprising result because we have already seen (Section 5) that
Indonesia is the only country which exhibited strong regional convergence through
almost the entire period under consideration. 
The equalizing effect of  differential growth rates can occur for two reasons
however. First, poorer regions may grow at faster rates than the rich. This is what we
studied above in Sections 4 and 5  dealing with income convergence. Second, although
there may be no income convergence among the regions as such, there could be a sort of
income convergence among the populous regions which, bearing in mind the importance
of populous regions for Concept 2 inequality, would tend to reduce inequality.  To
explain: assume that populous regions are uniformly distributed across income
distribution and that there is zero correlation between growth rates and initial incomes.
However, within the subgroup of populous regions, correlation between initial income
and growth may be negative. These regions’ incomes will therefore become more
clustered, and since it is them who “matter” for  Concept 2 inequality, it will go down. 
23
                                                          
23 Suppose that there are two rich and small regions called A and B, and two poor and populous regions
called C and D. Let there be no income convergence, and let  A and C grow at high positive rates, and B
and D decline. Now, Concept 2 inequality will increase since the two key regions which, because of their
sizes determine what happens to Concept 2 inequality, will have become dissimilar. Note that this takes
place while there is neither income divergence, not a relationsahip between population size and growth—
but simply income divergence between populous regions.38
To check the second possibility we proceed to running regressions such as (3) but
inclusive of  population weights. Figure 8 shows the results; it is the  equivalent of the
unweighted results presented in Figure 6 above. The results are similar to those we
obtained for Concept 1 convergence but are stronger in the sense that convergence or
divergence episodes are less unambiguous. The clearest results are for India and
Indonesia. India shows statistically significant regional divergence since the early 1990’s.
Indonesia, on the contrary, statistically significant regional convergence all the way to
mid-1990’s. Brazil too was converging in terms of population-weighted GDPs per capita
until the mid-1990’s. The United States has had a long period of convergence in the
1990’s, and a shorter one between 1982 and 1987. Finally, for China, it is only in the
five-year period ending in 1999, that we come close to having a statistically significant
regional convergence. For the rest of the time, the results are inconclusive. 
Consider now what is behind these results. As mentioned before, Concept 2
convergence or divergence is in reality a convergence or divergence within the subset of
populous regions. The difference in outcomes among the most populous states is very
clear in the case of India. Consider the three most populous Indian states: Uttar Pradesh
(population 170 million in 1999), Bihar (107 million) and Maharashtra (95 million).
Between 1990 and 1999,  GDP per capita in Maharashtra that was the richest of the three
states increased by 60 percent (in real terms).  Meanwhile, in Bihar—which is the poorest
state in India—GDP per capita remained the same. Finally, Uttar Pradesh—which has the
median level of income among the states—saw its GDP per capita increase by about 15
percent. The situation is similar in China. The three largest provinces are Sichuan
(population 114 million in 2000), Henan (92 million) and Shandong (91 million). During
the decade of the nineties, Shandong which was the richest of the three in 1990 had its
real GDP per capita triple. Henan’s GDP per capita increased by 2½ times, and Sichuan’s
(which was the poorest of the three provinces) doubled. And then consider, in contrast,
the three most populous Indonesian provinces: West Java (36 million in 2000), East Java
(35 million) and central Java (31 million). Their GDPs per capita in 1983 were fairly
close to each other and, taking the richest as the numeraire, could be written as 1, 0.97
and 0.74. In 2000, they were even more clustered at 1, 0.93 and 0.84.  39
Figure 8.  Unconditional β regional population-weighted convergence or divergence
(β coefficient with the 95 confidence interval)
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7. How to explain changes in inter-regional inequality?
As we have seen,  levels of  inter-regional inequality are quite different in the five
countries. Indonesia and Brazil have the highest level of inequality. They are followed by
China. India is in  the middle but is the only country showing a consistent increase in
inter-regional inequality while the United States displays the most uniform levels of GDP
per capita between its components. We shall try to explain within-national convergence
or divergence in more general terms, that is by looking at the variables of interest that
might add or reduce inter-regional inequalities. These variables are not easy to identify in
general because of countries’ specificities. Thus, for example, the same overall growth
rate might produce regional divergence in one case, and regional convergence in another
depending on what drives growth. When growth is narrow-based as in case of oil
production, the differences between regions (oil-rich and the rest) are likely to increase.
When growth is broad-based, or is fuelled by agricultural growth (as in the case of  China
during the early liberalization), growth can be expected to help convergence as poorer
(and agricultural) regions catch up with rich regions. The general presumption—as we
have seen from Williamson’s (1965) hypothesis—is that growth will tend to be regionally
disequalizing (even if ultimately higher income may be associated with lower
inequalities). We may thus expect growth rate to be positively related to regional
inequality. It is also a finding obtained by Petrakos et al . (2003) in their study of regional
inequality in the European Union.  The same results are further reported in the case of
Indonesia by Akita and Kawamura (2002, p.12) who find that the period of fast growth
between 1993 and 1996 was associated with a slightly increasing Concept 2 inequality
while the crisis led to a decline in regional inequality (p.16).
24 In a long-run 1939-95
study of Brazil’s regional inequality  Azzoni (2001, p. 144) finds the same relationship.
Similarly, the effect of  greater openness (trade to GDP ratio) may be ambiguous.
Openness can help the already rich regions, or can create income gaps where none
existed. But it can also help poorer regions whose output (e.g. agricultural goods) was
                                                          
24 These results differ from those reported above in Figure 7 and are based on a much more detailed
partitioning than ours. Akira and Kawamura had access to the GDPs per capita data from about 300
disctricts vs. our results which are based on the data from 26 provinces.41
artificially held down through price controls. On the other hand, one can argue that there
may be certain policies associated with globalization whose effects are less likely to be
ambivalent. They include policies of financial liberalization and higher interest rate that
tend to favor rich households. To the extent that rich people are concentrated in certain
areas, such policies will increase spatial inequality. As for the empirical results, they span
the entire gamut. Kanbur and Zhang (2003) find that openness was associated with rising
inequality in China. Zhang and Zhang (2003) similarly decompose Concept 1 inequality
between China’s states and find that about 20 percent of differences in provincial GDPs
per capita can be ascribed to differences in trade shares (p. 57).
25 Petrakos et al. (2002, p.
19) however find that openness (defined as regional integration within the European
Union
26) did not have a uniform impact on all EU countries: in some it was associated
with greater regional inequality, in others by smaller, and in some had no statistically
significant effect at all. Wei and Wu (2001) using  urban/rural ratios of mean income for
more than 100 cities and their adjoining areas in China find that in the period 1988-93
increased openness tended to reduce the urban/rural ratio. Since urban/rural differences
are perhaps the principal explanation for regional inequality in  China (see Annex 2),
increased openness would seem to reduce  regional inequality. 
Visual inspection of Figure 9 which displays the relationship between openness
and Concept 1 inequality shows that all of our five countries (with the exception of
Indonesia), have, as we would expect, relatively low openness. The graph also shows that
in China, increased openness was not associated with increased regional inequality while,
on the contrary, in India, this seems to be clearly the case.  At the other extreme is
Indonesia where increased openness was associated with a decrease in regional
inequality. Finally in Brazil and the United States, there was no apparent relationship
between openness and regional inequality. The conclusion is that the country experiences
differ and that openness as such may not have the same discernable effects on countries
                                                          
25 Their approach is interesting because they run production functions of the same form for all provinces.
One of the arguments in the production function is trade ratio (in addition to education, domestric and
foreign capital accumulation etc.) Then log variance of GDPs per capita is decomposed and the regression
coefficients times the covariance between income and each argument gives an estimate of that particular
argument’s contribution to inter-provincial income inequality.42
regardless of their level of development, type of economic institutions, and other macro
economic policies. 
A somewhat different picture however emerges when we look at the relationship
between Concept 2 inequality and openness (Figure 10). It is now very clear that in both
China and India, increased openness was associated with greater regional inequality. In
Indonesia, the relationship is the opposite and in Brazil and the US the correlations seems
non-existent. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
26 And measured as share of European trade in country’s total trade.43
Figure 9. The relationship between openness and Concept 1 inequality
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We then run the following fixed-effect panel regressions for both Gini1 and
Gini2, and Theil1 and Theil2:
it i i i it i it u t INFL t RINT t OPEN GDP t ROG T G + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β ln / ( 4 )
where i denotes country, t = year, and G = Gini coefficient, T = Theil index, ROG
= real annual rate of growth of per capita GDP, GDP = level of  GDP per capita
(expressed in logs), RINT = real interest rate (on deposits) in percent per annum, INFL =
the average annual rate of inflation proxied by the change in consumer price index. It is
an unbalanced panel since the number of observations for each country is not the same
(e.g. for China we have the data for the 1978-2000 period, but for Indonesia only for
1983 to 2001). Since there are certainly fixed country-specific effects for which we
cannot control, we use the fixed effects model. It is unlikely that regional inequality
would have much of a reverse effect on our RHS variables, so we do not instrument. 
The results of regression (4) are shown in Table 7. We show the results for Gini1
and Theil1 calculated from real values, and Gini2 and Theil2 from nominal values. There
are substantive reasons for this. Concept 1 deals with the issue of poor regions’ or
countries’ catch-up, that is of whether poor countries or regions experience faster real
growth. Then, an index of inequality based on differences in real incomes between the
regions is appropriate. Concept 2 however approximates the actual inequality between
individuals (note that it is no longer regions, but individuals that are de facto units of
observations even if we lack their incomes). Hence it is the difference in nominal
incomes within a nation at a point in time which reflects this inequality.
Regarding Concept 1 inequality, the results show that (for Theil) both level of
income and openness enter negatively, that is are associated with reduction in inter-
regional income differences. Contrary to several other studies, we do not find evidence
that higher rate of growth has a disequalizing effect on regional incomes. Moreover, if we
use the Gini coefficient, no variable is statistically significant and the quality of results is45
weak. The situation is different when we move to the determinants of Concept 2 regional
inequality. There, according to both Gini and Theil, openness is shown to result in greater
regional inequality. For example, a ten GDP point increase in the trade/GDP ratio is
associated with an inequality increase of 1.8 Gini points. This is not negligible.
Similarly, higher inflation and higher real interest rate are both associated with greater
regional (population-weighted) inequality. Doubling of inflation increases the inter-
regional Gini 0.6 points. The quality of the Concept 2 regressions is also much better: the
withn-R
2 is slightly above 0.5. In conclusion, regional inequality seems to rise in
response to high inflation, high real interest rates, and high openness. None of that is very
surprising. Trade tends to be regionally concentrated; so are assets (held by people in
wealthy regions) and an increase in the rate of return on those assets increases regional
disparities too. Finally, high inflation due to variability in real prices which it entails and
differences in regional product mixes will tend to influence incomes of different regions
differently. What is interesting however is that there is again no evidence that higher
growth is unequalizing.46
Table 7. Determinants of regional inequality































































84 84 68 68
Note: p values between brackets. Coefficients significant at 5 percent or less are shaded.
Real interest = real annual rate of interest in percent pa. divided by 1000.  Inflation = ln
(1+annual inflation rate in percent). Openness = trade/GDP (in nominal US dollars). GDP per
capita = ln GDP per capita  in 1995 international dollars. ROG = annual  rate of growth of GDP
per capita (expressed in fractions, e.g. 3 percent is  0.03). Gini and Theil in percent. Gini2 and
Theil2 regressions do not include Indonesia for which we do not have nominal regional GDP per
capita data. Gini and Theil are expressed as ratios. All regressions are fixed effect.47
8. Conclusions 
India and Indonesia bracket the changes. India, in the decade of the 1990’s
displays consistently increasing regional inequality of both Concept 1 and 2 types—
whether it is measured by the Gini or by the Theil index. The largest states (Maharashtra,
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) are strongly diverging in their incomes, and generally richer
states have registered faster growth.  There was similarly income divergence among the
populous states.  On the other end of the spectrum is Indonesia where regional income
convergence was almost uninterrupted between 1983 and  the Asian crisis, and so was the
reduction in Concept 2 inequality. Yet, one has to keep in mind that India still has the
lowest Concept 1 and 2 inequality of any country considered here save for the United
States while Indonesia is the most unequal of the five countries in both types of measures.
27  Thus, the “positive” evolution in Indonesia and the “negative” one in India need to be
qualified.  
Indonesia, Brazil and China also show some emptying out of the middle-income
level provinces—and an increase in the population shares living in either rich or poor
provinces/states. 
China, a country on which most studies of regional inequality have been written,
displays  strong  regional income convergence during the 1980’s which coincides with
the period of pro-poor agricultural reforms. This process of Concept 1 convergence
comes to an end in the 1990’s with provincial mean incomes growing at relatively similar
rates since. Despite Concept 1 stability, Concept 2 inequality has increased in the 1990’s
almost as much  as in India while its level is throughout greater. The increase in Concept
2 inequality was driven by the income divergence in the second half of the 1990’s
between several populous provinces. Again, while in India,  there is a contrast between
Maharashtra and Bihar, in China, the contrast is between Shandong and Sichuan. In that
sense China and India do display similar changes in the last decade: while Concept 1
Ginis have only moderately increased (indicating only a slight regional income
                                                          
27 Except for Brazil according to Concept 2 Gini.48
divergence) Concept 2 inequalities have gone up by much more driven by unevenness in
outcomes for the large states or provinces. 
The United States, despite being regionally most homogeneous, has generally
displayed tendency toward income convergence according to both inequality concepts.
Brazil shows least consistent change. There is only a slight change in both
Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality, but it is overshadowed by a cyclical effect of
inflation. It is therefore difficult to see whether there is any trend. However, Brazil has
the highest Concept 2 Gini inequality. To see how large that inequality is, one need
simply realize that were all incomes within each province absolutely equally distributed,
Brazil’s overall Gini would still be around 30, a moderate nation-wide inequality level.
For all countries as a whole, we find that greater openness (trade/GDP ratio) is
associated with lower inter-regional inequality when measured by Concept 1 and higher
inter-regional inequality when measured by Concept 2. This means that openness might
help growth of poorer regions within each individual country (that is, help convergence)
but at the same time might lead to a divergence in outcomes among the most populous
regions. Some of them may pull ahead, others fall back, and this in turn raises regional
(and possibly inter-personal) inequality. At the national level, we thus detect a process
directly opposite to the one noticed for the world as a whole where Concept 1 inequality
has increased during the last quarter of century (as poor countries have tended to lag in
growth rates behind the rich), while Concept 2 inequality has gone down driven by
exceptional performances of China and India. Finally, we also find that regional
inequality (Concept 2) is increased by high inflation and high real interest rates—none of
which is surprising.
The difference in the effect of openness on two kinds of inequality (Concept 1 and
2) is interesting first, because it shows us that—within countries—openness seems to
help the process of poor regions’ catch-up. But on the other hand, it suggests the presence
of a more complicated story where  either populous regions diverge among themselves or49
people move out of the regions with middling levels of income (some perhaps migrating
to richer regions while those in the poor regions remain stuck there) thus emptying out
the middle and contributing to higher regional population-weighted inequality. Because
the  latter  provides a better  approximation to actual regional inequality than Concept 2
as well as to how people perceive horizontal inequity, the link between greater openness
and greater inequality may, despite convergence in Concept 1,  be deemed stronger both
in actual fact and in popular perception. 
Global inequality changes and inequality changes in the  five most populous
countries in the world during the last two decades have indeed been quite dramatic but
also extremely complex. Note the following facts. While at the level of these countries,
we find some evidence for  the narrowing of (unweighted) inter-regional income
differences, Concept 2 inequality however tended to rise in the two most important
countries (India and China). But at the global level, a process directly opposite to the one
at the national level was simultaneously taking place. It consisted  of widening income
differences between the countries and a reduction in Concept 2 inequality thanks mostly
to China’s phenomenal growth. Even without addressing the most difficult task of
measurement of inter-personal inequality at the global level, one can easily see how
contradictory are recent changes in different facets of inequality  and how inadequate are
simple answers regarding both the direction of change and even more so regarding the
causality. In other words, when we ask a question as apparently simple as “what was a
change in inequality in X”, we need to define very carefully what we mean by inequality
since its different versions may easily move in the opposite directions.50
Annex 1. Administrative organization of the five countries and data coverage
China
China is officially administratively divided into 34 regional units: 23 provinces
(including Taiwan that the Chinese government considers as its province), 2 special
administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau), 5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner
Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet) and 4 municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin
and Chongqing).  The autonomous regions differ from the rest because of the presence of
significant non-Han minorities in them. We are not including in the analysis Taiwan since
it is a disputed region, and Hong Kong and Macau because the GDP data for them are not
shown together with other regions. In addition, Chongqing acquired the status of a
separate unit (municipality) only in 1997 and in our data is included together with
Sichuan. This therefore gives us 30 regional units which for simplicity we call
“provinces.”  Out of these thirty, full data sets (both nominal and real GDPs) are
available for 27 provinces which represent 99 percent of Chinese population (not
counting Taiwan and Hong Kong). For two provinces (Qinghai and Hainan), nominal
GDP is available from 1985 onwards. 
28 Hence in calculations with nominal values, 29
provinces are included. Finally, for Tibet neither real nor nominal GDP data are
available. 
A note is in order regarding Chinese GDP data. As is well known, all-China GDP
data are the subject of a long academic dispute. There are many views (Maddison, 2003,
p. 151; Maddison, 1998;  Heston, 2001) that Chinese official  statistics exaggerate the
level and rate of growth of the economy. While we tend to believe that these authors do
have a point and that the total GDP correction does make sense, the only source of
regional Chinese statistics is the official State Statistics Bureau. We thus use official
regional and nation-wide statistics for the entire 1978-2001 period. But another problem
then becomes apparent. Until 1994, the sum of provincial GDPs is approximately equal
                                                          
28 Hainan became a separate province in 1988. Previously it was part of Guangdong province.51
to the official value of the nation-wide GDP. The discrepancy is within a very narrow
range of 1-2 percentage points possibly due to the mistakes of classification. But after
1994, the sum of provincial GDPs is systematically greater (up to 15 percent) than the
nation-wide GDP. It is unclear what the source of this large discrepancy is. We have no
choice but to use the official regional data even if they are overestimated. Since we study
inter-regional inequality, so long as the data are about equally overestimated for all
provinces, there will be no bias in our measures of inter-regional inequality. 
India
India was until the year 2000 administratively divided into 25 states and 7 Union
territories. The Union territories are very small with the exception of the federal capital of
Delhi. In total they account for about 11 million people or a little over 1 percent of total
population (in the 1991 census). Out of 25 states, we have GDP per capita data for 14
states. These are the largest states comprising 92 percent of total Indian population in
2000. Of  the states for which we do not have the data, the largest are Assam, and Jammu
and Kashmir (respectively 23 and 8 million according to the 1991 census).  The disputed
parts of Kashmir are also omitted from the analysis (the data for them are included in
Chinese and Pakistani statistics).
In 2000, three new states were created. They are Uttaranchal or Uttarkhand
(population of 4 million), carved out of Uttar Pradesh (170 million before the split),
Jharkhand (population of  15 million) carved out of Bihar (107 million before the split),
and Chhattisgargh (population of 19 million) carved out of Madhya Pradesh (79 million
before the split). All three are based on ethnic distinctiveness from their “mother” states.
In our data for 2000, these states are included as part of their “mother” states. 
United States
United States is administratively divided in 50 states and 1 federal district (the
federal capital of Washington). United States also controls some 12 Commonwealths and
territories out of which Puerto Rico is the largest (3.7 million people). Our data cover the52
50 states and the District of Columbia. However, the latter, due to its peculiarities,
29 is
not included  in the analysis which thus bears only on the 50 federal units. Since
District’s population is only about 600,000 people, our coverage of the United States is
almost complete.
Brazil
Brazil is administratively divided in 26 states and 1 federal district (the federal
capital of Brasilia). Our data include all states with the exception of Tocantins for the
years 1985-88. The federal district of Brasilia (population 2 million) is not included.
Thus the population coverage is about 99 percent. 
30
Indonesia
Indonesia is administratively divided in 26 provinces.  Before East Timor’s
independence in 1999, there were 27 provinces. The data for East Timor are available for
the entire period during which it was an Indonesian province, but for the reasons of
comparability, we have omitted it from our calculations throughout the entire period. The
population coverage of Indonesia is thus 100 percent.
                                                          
29 For example, District’s GDP per capita is unrealistically high, at more than $PPP 90,000. This is due to
the fact that many businesses are registered in the District while people who work or own them live just
outside the borders of the District.
30 The  state level value added data for Brazil (available at Instituto Braseleiro de Geografia e Estatistrica,
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/default.shtm) display some of the
same problems as in China. The sum of state value added in some years (in the second half of the 1980’s)
exceeds the Brazil-wide GDP by a few percentage points, while in the more recent years, its sum falls short
by as much as 10 percentage points of the official Brazil’s total GDP.  However, part of that difference may
be expained by the fact that state data do not include the federal territory of Brasilia.53
Annex 2. Regional inequality in China
China at the end of the 20
th century: different regional inequality break-downs





Modified  Kanbur and
Zhang (2003) 
Bhalla, Yao and Zhang
(2003)
Milanovic (here)
Year 1998 2000 2000 1995 2000
Welfare concept GDP per capita Mean real per capita
consumption 1/
Mean real per capita
consumption 1/
Mean real per capita
consumption 2/
GDP per capita
Smallest unit with data District level GDP per
capita 




Aggregation By province (26) and by
regions (3)
By province (28) By province (28) By province (28) ---
Total number of observations (per
year)
335 56 56 56 29
Concept 2 Theil 3/ 24.9 24.8 24.8 13.9 10.4
 (which Theil?) Theil (1) Theil (0) Theil(0) Theil (1) Theil (1)
Between 3 large regions 6.6 (27)
Between provinces (within each
region)
2.8 (11)
Between 28 provinces alone 9.4 (38) 10.9 (44) 11.0  10.4 (100)
Within provinces (between districts) 15.6 (62)
Within provinces (between rural and
urban)
13.9 (56)
Between overall rural and urban
mean
13.9 (56) 10.4 (75)
Within rural areas, and within urban
areas
10.9 (44) 6.1 (25)
Within rural areas 3.8 (21)
Within urban areas 2.3 (4)
Concept 2 Gini 3/ n.a. 37.2 n.a. n.a. 24.454
Sources: Takahiro and Kawamura (2002, Table 1, p. 26). Kanbur and Zhang (2003, Table 2, p. 27). Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003, Table 2, p. 947).
Modified Kanbur Zhang consists of taking Kanbur and Zhang data and applying somewhat different partitions (for explanation, see the text below).
1/ In 1983 prices. 2/ In 1990 prices, using provincial price deflators. 3/ Based on the most detailed partition used in the paper, e.g. 335 observations in
Akira and Kawamura paper etc.  























Note: The Kanbur and Zhang (2003) and Bhalla, Yao and Zhang (2003) results should be very similar since their welfare concepts and the
aggregations/partitions are practically the same. And indeed, for the year 1995 (last year in Bhalla et al.) Kanbur and Zhang report a Concept 2 Theil of 17.7
while Bhalla et. al. have obtain a Theil of  16.5 (see the results in the Table here). However, inexplicably, in their paper Bhalla et. all (Table 2, p. 947) show the
total Concept 2 Theil of 13.87 while the sum of the three element into which the Theil is decomposed yields 16.54. I think that the latter amount is correct.55
The decomposition rules can be also presented graphically. In the Akita and
Kawamura (2002) paper, total inequality is the sum of three inequalities given in
“bolded” boxes with their respective values in the year 2000 given underneath the boxes.
We can now easily see that provinces within each of the three large regions are fairly
homogeneous (in terms of per capita income) and that the bulk of inequality is
concentrated at the provincial level (differences in incomes between districts) and
















Kanbur and Zhang (2003) decomposition has three components:
Province A
Province B
 (1) Difference between the overall rural and urban mean, (2) inequality within the urban
means (area U), and (3) inequality within the rural means (area R). The component (1) is
equal  to 13.9 Theil points, the sum of components (2) and (3) is equal to 10.9 Theil
points.
A modified Kanbur-Zhang (K-Zh) decomposition which we use here is to break
inequality by provinces. Then, the component (1) is inequality between all provincial
(total) means, and the component (2) is the sum of all inequalities between provincial
rural and urban means, that is inequality between Ua and Ra, plus inequality between Ub
and Rb and so forth. The component (1) amounts to 10.9 Theil points, 
31 the sum of rural-
to-urban inequalities within provinces amounts to 13.9  Theil points.
                                                          
31 Note that because of Theil’s exact decomposition property, inequality among Ps must be equal to
inequality among U’s plus inequality among R’s, that is the sum of Kanbur and Zhang’s components (2)










The results of the modified Kanbur and Zhang (K-Zh) decomposition can then be
represented as
China =  + 
These two decompositions suggest the following. First, note that the sum of two
shaded boxes in the Akura and Kawamura (AK) decomposition equals (by definition) the
shaded box in the modified Kanbur and Zhang decomposition.
32 But while for Akira and
Kawamura, the importance of the two shaded boxes adds to 9.4 Theil points, the shaded
box in the (modified) Kanbur and Zhang decomposition amounts to 10.9 Theil points.
The difference must be due to the use GDP per capita in one study vs. expenditure per
capita from household surveys in another. 
Second, from the Akira and Kawamura decomposition, we can conclude that
most of regional inequality in China is found between the three large regions and within
provinces (in other words, provinces contain districts with fairly unequal average
incomes).  But, the Kanbur and Zhang decomposition suggests that these districts are not
random, that is they are not randomly poor or rich. The main line of differentiation goes
between rural and urban areas. For while AK decomposition shows that inequality
between districts (within all provinces) equals 15.6 Theil points, the K-Zh decomposition
                                                          
32 This must be true for Theil (which both authors use) because of its decomposability.
Inequality between 26
provinces







shows that 13.9 out of these 15.6 Theil points is due to the differences between mean
rural and mean urban incomes.
33
Thus, in conclusion, we can say that if we break China into a very fine regional
partition, about 40 percent of thus calculated Concept 2 inequality is due to differences in
incomes between provinces. The bulk of the remaining 60 percent is due to the
differences in mean urban and rural income within provinces.  
                                                          
33 Abstracting from the fact that the things are not fully comparable because A-K use GDP per capita while
K-Zh use household survey data.59
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